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1. 
when people fail at a task, they often become 
discouraged and give up. They may also exert less effort 
and perform less well at similar tasks in the future 
(Seligman, 1975). Occasionally, however, failure has no 
such effects on individuals' efforts or expectations. They 
remain optimistic, indeed they may become. increasingly 
certain, that the "next" time they will succeed, and they 
are eager to try again. Thus, a man who fails to sell any 
cars during his first week as a car salesman, does not 
become discouraged as many others would be after such 
failures. Instead, he remains certain or becomes even more 
certain that he will succeed in his next sales attempt. 
Similarly , a Red Cross volunteer who fails to persuade any 
of the first group of people she contacts to pledge a blood 
donation, is surprisingly confident that her subsequent 
contacts will be far more successful. Why do these 
individuals remain optimistic after experiences of failure 
that would lead others to give up? Why do failures, at 
least in some situations, or for some people, seem to raise 
rather than lower expectations for the future? 
Two literatures are relevant to these questions--the 
achievement motivation literature ( cf. Kukla, 1972; 
Weiner, 1974; Weiner et al., 1971; Weiner & Kukla, 1970; 
Weiner & Sierad, 1975) and the learned helplessness 
Ii tera ture (cf. Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; 
Dweck, 1975; Dweck & Reppucci, 1973; Klein, Fencil-Morse, 
& Seligman, 1976; Wortman & Dintzer, 1978). Both 
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literatures emphasize that an individual's reaction to 
failure is determined by one's perception of why the failure 
occurred. If a person thinks that his or her failure was 
caused by factors that are not_ easily controlled or 
modified,the person might decide that subsequent failures 
are inevitable and will probably give up. By contrast, if 
the person thinks that the initial failure was produced by 
factors that can be readily controlled and modified, the 
person might decide that initial setbacks could be reversed 
and attempt the task again. Although there are many 
controllable and uncontrollable factors that may playa role 
in determining success or failure, researchers often have 
studied only two such factors. The controllable factor 
thought to promote expectancies of success in the face of 
difficulty and failure is "effort." That is, the used car 
salesman and the Red Cross volunteer might expect future 
success despite initial failures if they attribute those 
failures to their own lack of effort. They would 
resolve to try harder on subsequent attempts. 
simply 
The 
uncontrollable factor thought to promote failure 
expectancies is "ability." That is, individuals might expect 
future failure if they attribute their initial failures to 
their own lack of ability; they cannot easily increase 
their abilities on subsequent attempts (footnote 1). 
This paper does not dispute this analysis. Attributing 
failure 
factor 
to a controllable rather 
(like ability) should lead 
than an uncontrollable 
people to expect 
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subsequent success. However, this paper disagrees with the 
presumption that ~ndividuals expect success following 
failure Q.!ll.y when they believe that they did not "try hard 
enough," and that they could subsequently succeed merely by 
attempting the task again with more persistence or 
intensity. For some tasks, strategies and tactics, in 
addition to effort, determine whether an individual succeeds . 
. or fails. Sometimes one needs only effort sufficient to 
make the individual try again using different strategies. 
For example, whether one succeeds in selling cars depends in 
part on the strategic features of the sales pitch, and 
whether one persuades someone to donate blood depends 
largely on the specific persuasive strategy selected. 
Indeed, for such situations trying harder--in the sense of 
trying 
if the 
more of the same approach--may be counterproductive 
initial approach or tac tic was ineffective. 
Strategies have been shown to influence individuals' 
performance in achievement tasks (cf. McGraw, 1978) such as 
discrimination learning (Deiner & 
LeVine, & Philips, 1972) and insight 
1962, 1964), and in interpersonal 
1978) such as dating (Curran, 1977). 
Dweck, 1978; Gholson, 
problems (Glucksburg, 
tasks (cf. Zimbardo, 
Moveover, individuals 
often seem to be aware of this and cite ineffective 
strategies as the cause of failure. Witness the 
explanations commonly given for lost basketball games ("We 
should not have tried to run with them"), failed exams ("I 
studied for multiple choice questions and she gave us an 
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essay exam"), and lost loves ("I guess I just came on too 
strong") (footnote 2). 
Thus, strate~y choice is a major determinant of success 
and failure, and individuals may often attribute their 
failure to inappropriate and ineffective strategies. It is 
surprising then that strategies and strategy attributions 
have been largely ignored. Perhaps this reflects the fact 
that early work in this area, concerned with developing an 
attributional model of achievement motivation (Kukla, 1972; 
Weiner, 1974; Weiner et al., 1971; Weiner & Kukla, 1970; 
Weiner & Sierad, 1975) dealt primarily with simple 
single-strategy or algorithmic tasks (e.g., digit-symbol 
substitution tasks, anagrams, simple arithmetic problems) 
where the only apparent solution was to "try harder." But 
whatever the reason, the model that evolved did not 
emphasize strategy. 
The question then remains: What effect will 
attributing a failure to ineffective strategies have on 
individuals' expectations and performance? To answer this 
question, Jennings and Anderson (Note 1) compared 
individuals' reaction to failure who perceived task outcome 
to be primarily determined by either strategies or 
abilities. In that experiment, subjects were asked to 
persuade another student (via telephone) to donate blood to 
the Red Cross. Prior to attempting this task, each subject 
talked to another subject (actually a confederate in the 
5. 
experiment) who stated,in the course of discussing the 
upcoming task, that in his opinion a person's persuasiveness 
depended upon the "strategies" used (STRATEGY condition) or 
upon his or her "abilities" (ABILITY eondition). This 
attribution manipulation was designed to predispose subjects 
to later attribute their own outcomes to one or the other of 
these causal factors. Subsequently, subjects in both 
conditions were led to believe that they failed in their 
persuasion attempt. 
The primary prediction of the Jennings and Anderson 
study was that subjects led to attribute their initial 
failure to the relative ineffectiveness of their strategies 
would expect higher levels of subsequent success than would 
those subjects who had been led to attribute their failure 
to their lack of ability. Results confirmed this 
prediction. Both in the immediate experiment, and in an 
upcoming blood donor drive on campus, STRATEGY subjects 
expected more successes at the task than did ABILITY 
subjects. Also, STRATEGY but not ABILITY subjects expected 
their performance to improve with practice. These responses 
were further compared to those of control subjects who 
received no attribution manipulation prior to success or 
failure. It was found that STRATEGY subjects made estimates 
almost as high as those of control subjects who had 
initially succeeded. That is, despite their initial 
experience of failure, subjects who were induced to 
attribute that failure to strategic errors expected to 
6. 
perform as well as did subjects who initially experienced 
success. By contrast, ABILITY subjects made estimates as 
low as control subjects who initially failed, a result 
suggesting that, in the absence-of a manipulation, ability 
attributions may have predominated. 
These results d~monstrated that when individuals were 
"set" to attribute initial failure to the relative 
ineffectiveness of their strategies, rather than to any lack 
of ability, they expected higher rates of success following 
failure. The interpretation offered for these results was 
that when people are set to attribute ta.k outcome to 
strategies and fail, they conclude that by changing their 
strategies they will be more likely to succeed in the 
future. In contrast, subjects set to attribute task outcome 
to their abilities may not consider alternative approaches 
they could use and do not expect their performance to 
improve. This explanation suggests that those subjects 
attributing task outcome to strategies might in fact have 
attempted to improve their performance by trying out 
different and perhaps more effective strategies following 
initial setbacks. In contrast, subjects attributing task 
outcome to abilities should have been less likely to change 
their strategies following failure. But since subjects were 
not given any further opportunities to attempt the task, 
this implication was not tested. 
7. 
, 
To date, there is little direct evidence that strategy 
attributions affect the quality of performance. There is 
some suggestive correlational evidence concerned with 
individual differences in the attributions people 
chronically make for fail ure •. Deiner and Dweck (1978) 
demonstrated that children predisposed to attribute failure 
to "effort" persisted longer and performed better 
following failure at a discrimination task than did those 
Children predisposed to attribute failure to abilities. But 
discussing this particular study in terms of "effort" ~s 
potentially misleading to the extent that it connotes more 
persistence or intensity while doing the same thing will 
lead to improved performance. Children in this study who 
supposedly attributed failure to "effort" improved their 
performance by trying out different and more sophisticated 
strategies following failure. This implies that at least 
these children preseleated for individual differences in 
attributions, were attributing their failure to strategies 
rather than effort. 
The Deiner and Dweck study demonstrates one additional 
point. Strategy vs. ability attributions, may in part, 
reflect individual differences or piedispositons. In other 
words, strategy attributions may be both produced acutely by 
situational manipulations as in the Jennings and Anderson 
study and produced chronically by individual differences as 
in the Deiner and Dweck study. Acute causes might be 
something that someone hears,reads, or sees that temporarily 
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makes strategy a cognitively available (cf. Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973) explanation for failure. Although it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to specify why a given 
individual is predisposed to attribute ~ailure to strategy, 
we can speculate that the chronic causes might simply have 
been "acute" causes that occurred repeatedly over time 
and/oracross situations. For example, Dweck and her 
colleagues (Dweck, Davidson, Nelson, & Enna, 1978) suggest 
that a teacher's comments to a student (e.g., "You didn't 
use the right strategy to solve that problem") can produce a 
chronic predispostion in attributions if such comments are 
consistently repeated. 
The present paper pursued both these approaches in two 
experiments that compared the responses of subjects who were 
"set" to attribute task outcome to either strategies or 
abilities. In Study I, subjects were randomly selected and 
their attribution set was experimentally manipulated. In 
Study II, instead of manipulating attributions, subjects 
were preselected who had a chronic tendency to attribute 
failure to strategies or abilities. 
STUDy'I 
In Study I, subjects were asked to play the part of a 
volunteer radio announcer who was attempting to persuade 
other students to donate blood bY making a short 
presentation over the radio. This task was similar to the 
task used in the Jennings and Anderson study and shares some 
of its virtues. It seemed to relate to potentially 
ego-involving abilities and motives to succeed, yet subjects 
had no specific prior experiences (and thus no 
preconceptions) with it. In addition, it was a task for 
which outcomes could plausibly be attributed to either 
effort, ability, or strategy. However, the Jennnings and 
Anderson task was modified in order to give subjects 
repeated experiences of failure more efficiently. 
Prior to attempting the task, subjects listened as the 
experimenter quoted a Red Cross worker who indicated that in 
his opinion, persuading people to donate blood is a task in 
which either strategies (STRATEGY condition) or abilities 
(ABILITY condition) determine a volunteer's success or 
failure. Subsequently, both groups were given three 
opportunities to make a persuasive presentation over a 
microphone to a judge in the next room, and thus play the 
part of a radio announcer. After each attempt, a different 
judge (actually tape-recorded voices) told the subject that 
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the pitch was not very persuasive and that the subject had 
failed. 
The impac~ of the attribution manipulation was assessed 
in several ways. The impact on subjects' expectancies of 
success was measured prior to each attempt by asking them to 
predict their success on the next presentation, and was then 
measured following the last attempt by asking them to 
predict their success in an upcoming blood donor drive on 
campus. The impact on subjects' uses of persuasive 
strategies was measured by having judges rate each 
presentation for the number and type of persuasive 
strategies that were' used and the number of changes each 
subject made in these strategies over the three trials. The 
impact on the actual quality of subjects' persuasive 
attempts was measured by judges who rated each subject's 
first, presentation for persuasive effectiveness and each 
subject's later presentations for change in effectiveness. 
Finally, the impact of the attribution manipulation on 
subjects' verbal r.eports of their attributions for failure 
were assesssed by analyzing subjects' verbalizations and 
questionnaire responses following failure. 
These data were used to test four hypotheses. First, 
it was predicted that STRATEGY subjects would make more 
changes in their presentations and persuasive strategies 
during the three attempts than would ABILITY subjects. 
Second, it was predicted that STRATEGY subjects would expect 
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higher levels of future success than would ABILITY subjects. 
Third, it was predicted that because STRATEGY subjects would 
change their strategies more than would ABILITY subjects, 
STR-ATEGY subjects wciuld increase their a-ctual effectiveness 
more than ABILITY subjects during the three presentations. 
In making these predictions, we assumed that when STRATEGY 
subjects attribute their initial failures to ineffective 
strategies, they will attempt to change and improve them in 
order to become more successful. In contrast, since ABILITY 
subjects attribute their failures to low abilities which 
they can not control, they will not attempt to improve their 
presentations. In making the third prediction, we also 
assumed that subjects given only 5 minutes to prepare their 
first presentation will not be as effective as they could be 
if they worked on their presentation longer. Thus, 
attempting to change and improve strategies should increase 
the effectiveness of subsequent presentations. 
These three hypotheses specify behavioral (or 
behavioroid) consequences of subjects' attributions induced 
by the attribution manipulation. Verbal reports are often 
used in attribution research to check whether such 
manipulations 
attributions. 
are successful in altering subjects' 
This of course assumes that subjects are 
aware of and can accurately report on their attributions. 
Recently, however, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have questioned 
this assumption by arguing that subjects in psychological 
experiments are often unable to accurately report cognitive 
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proca~ses such as attributions that ~upposedly mediate 
behavior change. To address this issue, verbal measures 
were included in the present study not as a manipulation 
check, but as a test of a fourth hypothesis. It was 
predicted that when asked to explain their failures, 
STRATEGY subjects would report attributing failures to 
ineffective strategies while ABILITY subjects would report 
attributing failures to low abilities. 
13. 
Meth6i. 
Subjects. 
Subjects were 17 male and 13 female Stanford University 
undergraduates who participated in an experiment purported 
to be a study of persuasion techniques. Subjects received 
either $3.00 or credit toward a class requirement for their 
participation. Fifteen subjects were randomly assigned to 
each experimental condition. 
Proced.,re. 
Upon arrival, each subject was presented with a brief 
introduction to a study on persuasion techniques being 
conducted by the Red Cross, in preparation for an upcoming 
blood donor drive on campus. Specifically, each subject was 
told that the Red Cross was planning to conduct a radio 
blood drive campaign on campus in which student volunteers 
were to make short "pitches" on the campus radio station 
attempting to persuade their peers to donate blood. The 
experimenter explained that past radio campaigns had not 
been as effective as the Red Cross would like. While some 
volunteers were successful in getting a large number of 
people to donate blood, others were unsuccessful in getting 
anyone to donate. The experimenter then explained that the 
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Red Cross was conducting the present study to discover what 
factors determine whether a. volunteer succeeds or fails. 
Attribut~on manipulation. 
experimenter proceeded to offer 
At 
a 
this 
comment 
point, 
designed 
the 
to 
influence the manner in which the subject would perceive 
his/her performanGe in the experiment. He indicated that, 
in the opinion of a Red Cross staff member, persuading 
people to donate blood is a task in which either stategies 
(STRATEGY condition) or abilities (ABILITY condition) 
determine a volunteer's success or failure. Specifically, 
in the STRATEGY condition, the experimenter said, "We're 
conducting this research because no one in the Red Cross 
really knows why some volunteers are more .suc~essful than 
others. In fact, the only thing one person could say was 
that it seemed to him that one volunteer will say one type 
of thing over the radio and it will go over really well and 
persuade people to donate, but another will say something 
different and it wcin't persuade anyone." In the ABILITY 
condition the experimenter said, "We're conducting this 
research because no one in the Red Cross really knows why 
some volunteers are more successful than others. In fact, 
the only thing one person could say was that it seemed to 
him that not everybody was able to persuade people; 
people are just more persuasive than others." 
some 
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Persuasion task. The experimenter then explained that 
in order to d'iscover what factors influElnce a person's 
success or failure at persuading others over the radio to 
doriate blood, a radio campaign was being simulated. In it 
the subject's task would be to play the part of a radio 
announcer, and to make up and present a short speech that 
the subject thcught would be effective in persuading 
students to donate blood. The experimenter indicated that 
, 
the subject would have three opportunities to actually 
practice the presentation during the exper1ment, and that 
the subject would have five minutes immediately prior to 
each of these presentations to get ready. The experimenter 
explained that he would like to give the subject an idea of 
"how effective the presentation is on each of the trials. 
Of course, the best way to do this would be to broadcast it 
over the. radio and then survey students to determine the 
percentage that had been persuaded to donate blood. Since 
this is impractical, we've arranged for an expert judge to 
listen to each presentation over an intercom (in order to 
simulate a radio broadcast) and then estimate the percentage 
of students that in his opinion might donate if they heard 
the presentation over the radio." The subject was told that 
the judges would be three psychology graduate students who 
had .listened to a large number of radio presentations and 
had talked to a large number of Stanford students. These 
experiences had supposedly given them some intuitive 
understanding of why students are willing or unwilling to 
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donate blood. Each judge would listen to and evaluate only 
one of subject's three presentations. Bince in past radio 
campaigns, presentations on the average had persuaded about 
30% of Stanford students, -the judges had been instructed to 
tell the subject whether he thought the presentation would 
have persuaded more or fewer than this average figure. The 
experimenter then gave the subject information (obtained 
from the local Red Cross) about the blood donation 
procedure, and told the subject to take 5 minutes to get 
ready for the first persuasive attempt. 
Failure manipulation. During the experiment, each 
subject made a total of three presentations. About one 
minute after each of these presentations, a voice over the 
intercom indicated that the subject's presentation was weak, 
and would have failed to persuade even 30% (an average level 
of effectiveness) of students to donate. Subjects were led 
to believe that each voice belonged to a different expert 
judge who had just listened to the subject's most recent 
presentation. Actually, the voices were tape-recorded 
statements previously made by three graduate students in 
psychology in accordance with a prepared script. This 
procedure guaranteed that all subjects received identical 
feedback that was in no way contingent upon their actual 
performance. 
Measures of strategy JJ..§..§. .a.ru! change. 
To determine the actual content and quality of 
subjects' persuasive attempts, each attempt was recorded and 
later rated by three independent judges (one graduate and 
two undergraduate psychology majors) who were blind to the 
experimental condition of the subjects. 
Ratings Qf. dissimilarity, To obtain an initial measure 
of how much subjects varied their pitches over the three 
trials in the experiment, judges rated how dissimilar the 
second presentation was from the first, and how dissimilar 
the third was from the second.- Judges made these ratings by 
actually making three separate estimates of dissimilarity, 
which were then averaged into a single composite index of 
dissimilarity. These separate ratings are listed below. 
1. Overall dissimilarity: rating how dissimilar the two 
presentations were, considering both content and 
delivery simultaneously. 
2. Content dissimilarity: rating how dissimilar the two 
presentations were, considering only content. 
3. Delivery dissimilarity: rating how dissimilar the two 
presentations were, considering only delivery. 
Judges used 80-point scales anchored at "identical" (0) and 
"extremely dissimilar" (80) in making the above ratings. 
Thus, larger numbers represented increased dissimilarity. 
F" .•.•.•.. ' ..!.~: . . . .3 ~ .,' ~(- .. ~.' fi-
t 
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Since these three ratings all measured dissimilarity, 
composite indices of dissimiarity were calculated for each 
judge by averaging his/her three ratings. The inter-judge 
reliabilities for these indices were ~ = .50 for the second 
presentat,ion, and L = .70 for ~he third presentation. 
Composite ratings for a presentation were averaged to form a 
single overall index of dissimilarity for that presentation. 
This overall index was used in subsequent analyses. 
Ratings of .t.!:@. use 91. JW.ec i fic strategies am:!. tactics. 
Since dissimilarity ratings are a very general,and somewhat 
indirect, measure of the degree to which subjects changed 
their persuasive strategies over the three presentations, a 
more precise and direct measure was obtained by having the 
judges rate which specific strategies each subject used in 
each presentation. To do this, judges were given a list of 
14 persuasive tactics and strategies and asked to indicate 
which strategies on the list each subject used on each 
trial. A subject was given credit for using a strategy only 
if at least two of the three judges independently checked 
it. A complete list of these 14 tactics and strategies 
appears below. This list consists of both power strategies 
listed by Falbo (1977), and strategies subjects mentioned in 
a post-experime~tal questionnaire which asked them to list 
"all strategies and tactics you could have used to persuade 
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students to donate blood." 
1. Direct command: forcefully demanding or ordering 
students to donate. 
2. Expertise: claiming superior knowledge about blood 
donations. 
3. Repetition: merely repeating an already stated request. 
4. Bargaining: explicitly stating reciprocating favors 
or benefits students would receive if they donated. 
5. Direct request: explicitly stating a request without 
supporting evidence or threats. 
6. Peer pressure: emphasizing peer pressure. 
7. Ease, convenience, and safety: emphasizing that 
donating blood is easy, convenient, and safe. 
8. Fear: inducing fear by emphasizing negative personal 
consequences to students that would result if they did 
not donate. 
9. Guilt and shame: inducing guilt and shame by 
emphasizing negative consequences to others if stUdents 
did not donate. 
10. Duty and obligation: emphasizing that students have a 
duty and an obligation to don~te blood; 
20. 
11. Interesting and enjoyable: emphasizing that donating 
blood is interesting and/or enjoyable. 
12. Pride and satisfaction: emphasizing that students would 
experience a feeling of pride and satisfaction if they 
donated. 
13. Compassion, charity, and sympathy: inducing a feeling 
of compassion, charity, or sympathy for those who need 
blood. 
14. Critical shortage of blood: emphasizing that there is 
a critical shortage of blood in the area. 
Self-ratings of future success. 
To determine if subjects thought specific strategy 
changes they planned to make in their presentations would 
affect how effective the presentation would be, subjects 
asked to predict how effective their "next" 
presentation would be. Specifically, after subjects had 
prepared for each presentation, but immediately before they 
actually gave it, they were asked to predict the percentage 
of students that their presentation woulp be successful in 
persuading if it were to be broadcast over the radio 
(immediate success prediction). Following the final 
presentation, subjects were asked to predict the percentage 
of students they would be able to persuade over the radio in 
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an upcoming blood drive on campus if they had . a chance to 
practice (long-term success prediction). 
Ratings of effectiveness ~ change in effectiveness. 
Finally, to determina if subjects' strategy vs. 
ability attributions affected the quality of their. 
subsequent presentations, the judges rated each presentation 
for its persuasive effectiveness. To rate the effectiveness 
of a presentation, each judge actually made seven separate 
ratings for each presentation and these ratings were then 
averaged to form a composite index of effectiveness for that 
presentation. These seven ratings are listed below. 
1. Overall effectiveness: rating how overall effective 
(considering both content and delivery) .the presentation 
would be in persuading students over the radio. 
2. Content effectiveness: rating how effective the 
content of the presentation would be in persuading 
students. 
3. Delivery effectiveness: rating how effective the 
delivery of the presentation would be in persuading 
students. 
4. Inflection: rating how much the subject varied his/her 
voice pitch and tone. 
5. Fluency: rating how fluent the subject was. 
6. Calmness: rating how calm the subject scunded. 
7; Speech rate variability: rating how much the subject 
varied his/her speech rate. 
22. 
For each subject's first presentation, judges made 
absolute ratings using scales anchored at "not at all" (0) 
and "extreme" (80). However, for the second and third 
presentations, the judges made relative ratings by comparing 
each of these presentations to the preceding presentation 
made by that subject. The overall effectiveness, content 
effectiveness, and delivery effectiveness scales were 
80-point scales anchored at ."much worse" (-4D)and "much 
better" (+4D), with a midpoint labeled "no change" (0). The 
inflection, fluency, calmness, and speech rate variability 
scales were BD-point scales anchored at "much less" (-4D) 
and "much more" (+40), with a midpoint labeled "no change" 
(0). Positive numbers on these scales represented increased 
effectiveness and negative numbers represented decreased 
effectiveness. 
Since these seven ratings were all designed to measure 
effectiveness, composite indices of effectiveness (or change 
in effectiveness) were calculated for each judge by 
averaging his/her seven ratings. The inter judge 
reliabilities for these indices were ~ = .65 for the first, 
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1:. = • 71 for the second, and 1:. = .75 for the third 
presentation. Because of this consistency across judges, 
the three judges' composite ratings for a presentation were 
averaged to form a-single overall index of effectiveness or 
change in effectiveness for that presentation. These 
overall indices were then used in subsequent analyses 
reported in this paper. 
Subjects' verbal reports Qf attributions 1Q.r. failur~. 
The final measures in the experiment assessed subjects' 
reports of the attributions they had made for their failures 
at the persuasion task. Verbal reports were assessed in 
three different ways. 
Coding subjects' verbalizations. Each time the subject 
was given performance evaluation by the "judge", the 
experimenter 
he/she was 
asked the subject to talk aloud and state what 
ltlj 
think" about. By tape-recording, transcribing, 
and categorizing these verbalizations, it was possible to 
determine what type of attributions subjects made for 
failure. A rater, blind to subjects' experimental 
condition, classified each verbalization into one or more of 
eight categories. These categories were derived by Anderson 
and French (Note 2) to characterize the reasons individuals 
give for success and failure. The additional category 
"repeat" was added since preliminary analyses suggested that 
subjects sometimes merely repeated statements they had made 
z 
earlier. These categories are iisted below. 
1. Strategy: statements about the particular approach, 
method, or technique that was used. 
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2. Ability: statements about the subject's skill, talent, 
or capability in the situation. 
3. Effort: statements about how hard the subject tried to 
succeed, independent of the strategies used. 
4. Trait: statements regarding some pervasive 
characteristic of the subject's personality. 
5. Mood: statements about the temporary mood.state the 
subject was in. 
6. External circumstances: statements about other people, 
events, or aspects of the situation which the subject 
could not control. 
7. Repeat: statements that merely repeated or elaborated 
on something already said without adding new content. 
8. Other: statements that did not fit into the above 
categories. 
Seligman-type questionnaire. A second measure of 
subjects' explanations for failure consisted of a 
questio~naire patterned after one developed by Seligman 
(Note 3). In this questionnaire, the subject first listed 
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the major cause of these failures at the persuasion task. 
The subject then rated this cause on three 7-point scales 
described below. 
1. External/Internal. Subjects first rated whether the 
cause was "totally due to other people or circumstances" 
(external, +3), "totally due to me" (internal, -3), or 
somewhere in between. 
2. Unstable/Stable. Subjects then rated whether the cause 
would "never again be present" (unstable, +3), "would 
always be present" (stable, -3), or somewhere in 
between. 
3. Specific/Global. Subjects finally rated whether the 
cause "influences just this particular situation" 
(specific, +3), "influences all situations in my life" 
(global, -3), or somewhere in between. 
In the attribution literature, ability is defined as 
being internal and stable, while strategy would be defined 
as being internal and unstable. Thus, STRATEGY subjects 
should rate the causes of their failures as internal and 
unstable while ABILITY subjects should rate the causes of 
their failures as internal and stable. Also, Seligman (Note 
3) has shown that "specific" ratings are associated with 
attempting to reverse initial ~etbacks while "global" 
ratings are associated with giving up. Thus, we might 
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expect STRATEGY subjects to rate the causes of their 
failures as specific-while ABILITY subjects might rate the 
causes as global. 
Weiner-type questionnaire. After completing the 
Seligman-type scale, subjects completed a questionnaire 
patterned after those used by Weiner and his col-leagues (cf. 
Weiner et al., 1971). In this questionnaire, the subject 
was asked to consider specific causal factors and to 
indicate whether each factor was "not at all important" (0) 
or "extremely important" (6) in influencing the outcome 
(failure) of their persuasive attempts. These factors were: 
1. Strategy. 
2. Ability. 
3. Specific characteristics of the judges. 
4. Effort. 
5. Specific characteristics of the situation or task. 
6. Luck. 
In terms of the basic two-factor attribution model 
mentioned earlier, "Strategy" and "Effort" would be internal 
and unstable, "Ability" is internal and stable, "Specific 
characteristics of the judges, situation, or taik" are 
external and stable, and "Luck" is external and unstable. 
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Of these factors, "Strat~gy" is the only factor that has not 
been previously studied. 
Debriefing. 
After each subject had completed the above 
questionnaires near the .end of the experiment, the 
experimenter asked a series of questions designed to assess 
the subjects' suspicions regarding the various experimental 
manipulations and deceptions used (cf. Aronson & Carlsmith, 
1968). No subjects detected that the judges' evaluations 
during the experiment were actually prerecorded messages 
heard by all subjects, and ·no subjects suspected the 
hypothesis regarding the use and change of strategies 
following failure. The experimenter then explained the true 
purpose and hypotheses of the experiment, concentrating on 
the impact the outcome manipulation might have had on the 
subjects' self impressions. This "process debriefing" 
procedure (cf. Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard~ 1975) has proven 
effective in eliminating the persistent impact of false 
feedback. 
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Results. 
In Study 1,- subjects were induced to attribute their 
performance at a persuasion task to either strategies 
employed or.general ability levels. Subjects tpen made a 
series of three presentations, each of which ended in 
apparent failure. Subjects pred~cted their likely success 
for each of these presentations and reported their 
attributions for failure. Judges rated these presentations 
for strategy use and for persuasive effectiveness. These 
data were analyzed in order to test the major hypotheses of 
this study. 
First, subjects' expectations and performance prior to 
the failure manipulation will be examined. Then subjects' 
expectations and performance subsequent to the failure 
manipulation will be examined to assess whether the 
attribution manipulation (strategy vs. ability) affected 
their responses to apparent failure. These analyses tested 
the hypotheses that STRATEGY subjects make more strategic 
changes in their presentations, predict higher levels of 
future success, and improve their performance more than do 
ABILITY subjects. Finally, subjects' verbal reports 
regarding their attributions will be examined to determine 
if the "attribution" manipulation directly affected 
subjects' explanations for failure. 
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Subjects' performance ~ expectations prior iQ failure. 
It will be recalled that prior to receiving any failure 
feedback in the experiment, subjects prepared and delivered 
their first presentation. There seemed'to be no difference 
in the strategic approaches used by the two groups in this 
·first presentation. On the average, .each STRATEGY subject 
used 3.0 of the 14 specific strategies which judges rated 
and each ABILITY subject used 2.6 strategies (~(28)= .86, 
n.s, see footnote 3) (Table 1). In addition, for none of 
the strategies was there' a difference, that reached the 
.05 level of significance, in the number of 
STRATEGY and ABILITY subjects that used it (Table 2). 
Similarly, there were no differences in subjects' success 
expectancies for this presentation. Subjects predicted 
their success on this first attempt before they delivered it 
by estimating the percentage of students listening to it on 
the radio that would be persuaded to donate blood. As can 
be seen in Table 3, STRATEGY and ABILITY subjects made 
virtually identical predictions of immediate success prior 
to receiving any failure feedback (means were 27.2~ and 
27.7~, ~(28)= .13, n.s.). 
Despite these similarities in strategies employed and 
predictions, however, there was a slight tendency for 
STRATEGY subjects to actually perform better than ABILITY 
subjects on the first presentation (Table 1). STRATEGY 
subjects' mean effectiveness was rated at 48.2 while ABILITY 
Table 1 
Study I 
Subjects' -mean number of strategies used and. effectiveness ratings 
for the first presentation 
ITEM 
Number of strategies used. 
Effectiveness 
STRATEGY 
).0 
48.2 
ABILITY· 
2.6 
44.2 
)0. 
Table 2 
Study I 
Number of subjects using each persuasive strategy 
on the first presentation 
ITEM 
. Direct command 
Expertise 
Repetition 
Bargaining 
Direct request 
Peer pressure 
Ease, convenience, & safety 
Fear 
Guilt & shame 
Duty & obligation 
Interesting & enjoyable 
Pride & satisfaction 
Compassion, charity, & sympathy 
Critical shortage of blood 
STRATEGY 
2;' 
o 
o 
5 
3 
o 
12 
3 
1 
1 
o 
4 
1 
13 
ABILITY 
3 
o 
1 
2 
2 
o 
10 
3 
3 
1 
o 
o 
o 
14 
, , 
, 31. 
Table 3 
Study I 
Subjects' mean predictions of success 
ITEM 
. STRA'IEGY ABILITY 
Immediate success prediction 
First presentation 27.'2:% 27.7% 
Second presentation 25.4% 26.0% 
Third presentation 25.8% 24.3% 
Long-term success prediction 39.5% 32.9% 
32. 
.,.:. 
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subjects' mean effeciiveness was rated at only 44.2 
(~(28)= 1.45, ~<.16). Thus, even prior to the failure 
feedback, there was an impact of the attribution 
manipulation on the quality of subjects' presentations. 
Subjects' expectakions ~ performance following failure, 
After their first presentations (and later after the 
second and third presentations), all subjects were told by a 
"judge" that their presentations were not very effective and 
would have failed to persuade even an average number (30%). 
of students to donate blood. Subjects were then given 
severXal minutes prior to both the second and third 
presentations to prepare for their next persuasive attempt. 
What effect did this failure manipulation have on subjects 
who attributed their outcomes to either strategies or 
abilities? Overall, STRATEGY subjects made more changes in 
their strategic approaches to the task, made higher 
predictions of long-term success, and became more effective 
with practice than did ABILITY subjects. 
There were differences in STRATEGY and ABILITY 
subjects' approaches to the second and to the third 
presentations. Notably, STRATEGY subjects changed their 
presentations during the three trials more than did ABILITY 
subjects. Th~s is evident in judges' ratings of how 
dissimilar the second and third presentations were to the 
previous presentation (Table 4 ) • STRATEGY subjects' 
Table 4 
Study I 
Subjects' mean dissimilarity ratings, number of strategy shifts, and 
effectiveness change ratings for the second and third presentations. 
ITEM STRATEGY ABILITY 
Dissimilarity 
Second presentation 26.4 18.7 
Third presentation 24.1 15.1 
Number of strategy shifts 
Second presentation 1.6 0.9 
Third presentation 1.7 1.0 
Effectiveness change 
Second presentation 0.8 0.5 
Third presentation 2.5 -0.2 
34. 
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presentations were rated as more dissimilar than those of 
ABILITY subjects, for both the second presentation (means 
were 26.4 and 18.7, ~(27)= 2.14, 1L< .06) and the third 
presentation-(means were 24.1 and 15.1, ~(27) = 1.87, 1L< 
.08) (footnote 4). This tendency for STRATEGY subjects to 
vary their presentations more than ABILITY subjects is 
further illustrated when we consider-the number of times 
each subject either added a strategy not used or dropped a 
strategy used on the preceding trial (Table 4). STRATEGY 
subjects made an average of 1.6 strategy shifts, .while 
ABILITY subjects made only .9 shifts on the second 
presentation (~(28) = 1.70, 1L< .10). STRATEGY subjects then 
made an average of 1.7 shifts, while ABILITY subjects made 
only 1.0 shifts on the third presentation (~(28)= 1.37, 
1L< .15). By calculating the total number of shifts each 
subject made on the second and third presentations, we find 
that on the average STRATEGY subjects made a total of 3.3 
shifts during the experiment while ABILITY subjects made a 
total of only 1.9 shifts (~(28) = 2.07, 1L< .05). 
Despite these differences in strategic responses to 
fai~ure, STRATEGY and ABILITY subjects did not differ in 
their predictions of immediate success for either the second 
(means were 25.4% and 26.0%, ~(28)= .21, n.s.) or third 
presentations (means were 25.8% and 24.3%, ~(28)= .50, n.s) 
in the experiment. But when they were asked how successful 
they would be in an upcoming blood drive if they had a 
chance to practice (long-term success), STRATEGY subjects 
)6. 
predicted a success rate of 39.5% while ABILITY subjects 
predi'cted a success rate of only 32.9% (~(28)= 2.11, 
1« .05) (Table ). 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the results is 
that, according to the ratings of the judges, STRATEGY 
subjects actually became more effective over the three 
trials than did ABILITY subjects (Table 4). While on the 
second presentation there was no difference in rated change 
in effectiveness (means were .8 and .5, ~(27)= .62, n.s.), 
on the third presentation STRATEGY subjects improved while 
ABILITY subjects gct slightly worse (means were 
+2.5 and -.2, ~ ( 2 7) = 1.81, 1« • 10) • By adding each 
subject's effectiveness change scores for the second and 
third presentations. we obtain an index of each subject's 
total improvement during the experiment. This index shows 
that STRATEGY subjects' total improvement was rated at 3.3 
while ABILITY subjects' total improvement was rated at only 
.2 (~(27)= 2.17. 1« .0.4). 
Subjects' verbal reports of attributions for failure. 
These results indicate that the attribution 
manipulation--strategy vs. ability--had a significant 
impact on subjects' performance and expectations. Subjects' 
verbalizations and questionnaire responses following failure 
w~ll now be examined to determine if subjects' verbal 
reports of attributions were similarly affected. 
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Immediately following each failure manipulation, subjects 
were asked .to verbalize their thoughts. These 
verbalizations were later categorized to determine if 
STRATEGY and ABILITY subjects reported making different 
attributions for failure (Table 5). Surprisingly, there 
were no significant differences in the number of STRATEGY 
and ABILITY subjects that reported each attribution. But 
perhaps the most important aspect of these results is that 
all subjects in 
indicating that 
both conditions mentioned strategy, 
for this task strategies were perceived to 
be an extremely important determinant of performance. In 
contrast, only one subject mentioned effort. 
At the end of the experiment, two questionnaires were 
also used to assess subjects' verbal reports of attributions 
for failure. On a Seligman-type questionnaire, subjects 
were asked to specify the major cause for their failure and 
to then describe whether this cause was external or 
internal, unstable or stable, and specific or global. There 
were no significant differences between STRATEGY and ABILITY 
subjects' explanations on this questionnaire (Table 6). On 
a Weiner-type questionnaire, subjects were asked to consider 
a number of possible causes provided by the experimenter, 
and to rate how important each was in determining task 
outcome. On this questionnaire, STRATEGY and ABILITY 
subjects Qid not differ in how important they thought the 
factors of Strategy, Ability, Judges, Effort, or External 
characteristics of the task were. Luck was the only factor 
Table 5 
Study I 
Number of subjects making verbalizations in each category 
CATEGORY· 
. STRATEGY ABILITY 
Strategy 15 15 
Ability 9 5 
Effort 1 0 
Trait 9 13 
Mood 9 10 
Circumstances 10 11 
Repeat 9 9 
other 0 0 
. , 
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Table 6 
Study I 
39. 
Subjects' mean ratings of Seligman-type and Weiner-type questionnaires 
ITEM STRATEGY ABILITY t 
Seligman-type questionnaire 
Internal/External 0.07 -0.53 1.27. 
Stable/Unstable 0.60 0.00 1.04 
Global/Specific 0.87 1.20 .58 
Weiner-type questionnaire 
Strategy lj..lj.o lj..33 .15 
Ability lj..67 lj..20 .96 
Effort lj..87 lj..93 .12 
Characteristics of judges 3.87 3.78 .13 
Characteristics of task lj..lj.7 4.87. .73 
Luck 3.('0 ·1.73 2.60* 
* E < .02 
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for which there was a significant difference, with STRATEGY 
subjects rating this as more important (means were 
3.0 and 1.7,~(28)= 2.60, R< .02). Perhaps this indicates 
that STRATEGY subjects thought themselves lucky to have 
developed an effective persuasive strategy in the short time 
they had to prepare. 
Thus, on these measures, none of the predicted 
differences in subjects' verbal reports of attributions were 
apparent. This is surprising, considering the strong 
differences in expectancies and performance that were 
supposedly mediated by subjects' different attributions for 
failure. 
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STUDY II 
Before pursuing the implications of these findings, we 
shall examine the association between individual differences 
or predispositions in attributions (strategy' vs. ability) 
made for failure and responses to failure. In Study II, 
instead of manipulating the attributions of randomly 
selected subjects, subjects were preselected who already had 
a chronic predisposition to attribute failure to strategies 
or abilities. 
To understand the basis of subject selection in Study 
II, recall that the attribution literature demonstrates that 
individuals who attribute failure to a controllable rather 
than an uncontrollable factor should expect success 
following failure. The presumption in this literature is 
that these individuals expect success because they believe 
they did not "try h~rd enough," and that they could succeed 
merely by attempting the task again with more persistence 
while doing the same thing. The point of this paper, 
however, is that strategy choice is also an important 
determinant of success and failure, and that individuals 
often believe they. can "control" and change strategy in 
order to succeed following failure. To demonstrate this, in 
Study II, two groups were selected on the basis of their 
responses to a questionnaire item which asked individuals to 
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imagine themselves failing at a hypothetical communication 
task, and to then describe whether t~e cause of this failure 
was controllable or uncontrollable. One group 
(HIGH-MASTERY) indicated they could control the cause, whil~ 
a second group (LOW-MASTERY) indicated they could not 
control the cause. 
These two groups of subjects were then asked, as in 
Study I, to play the part of a radio announcer who was 
attempting to persuade students to donate blood to the Red 
Cross. In Study II, the experimenter made no attempt to 
alter subjects' typical or "normal" attributions for failure 
at this task--he merely indicated that persuading people to 
donate was a difficult task at which some succeed and some 
fail. Subsequently, both HIGH-MASTERY and LOW-MASTERY 
subjects were given three opportunities to make a persuasive 
presentation over a microphone, supposedly to an expert 
"judge." After each attempt, subjects were told by a "judge" 
(actually the same tape-recordings used in Study I) that 
they had failed to be very persuasive. The same dependent 
measures used in Study I were used in this study to assess 
subjects' expectations of sucoess, use of strategies, actual 
persuasive effectiveness, and verbal reports of 
attributions. 
It was. expected that HIGH-MASTERY subjects would 
attribute their failures in the experiment to ineffective 
strategies while LOW-MASTERY subjects would attribute their 
failures to 
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low abilities, and that these different 
attributions would be associated with d~fferent responses to 
failure. Specifically, the predictions were: (1) 
HIGH-MASTERY subjects woul-d expect higher levels of future 
success, (2)· would make more changes in their strategic 
approach over trials, and (3) would perform more effectively 
and improve more with practice than LOW-MASTERY subjeots. A 
final hypothesis was that HIGH-MASTERY subjects would report 
attributing failure to strategies, while LOW-MASTERY 
subjects would report attributing failure to abilities. 
~. 
Method 
Subjects. 
Subjects were 15 male and 15 female Stanford University 
undergraduates who were preselected for their tendencies to 
attribute failure to either controllable (internal and 
unstable) or uncontrollable (internal and stable) factors. 
Subjects received either $3.00 or credit toward a class 
requirement for their participation in a supposed study of 
persuasion techniques. Fifteen subjects were recruited for 
each condition. Until the end of the experiment, subjects 
were unaware that they had been seleoted for their 
attributional tendencies. Also, during the study the 
experimenter did not know how subjects had responded to the 
preselection questionnaire item. 
Procedure. 
The procedure used was identical to the one used in 
Study I, except that the experimenter made no attempt to 
manipulate subjects' attributions for failure. In Study II, 
subjects were preselected who were predisposed to make a 
particular attribution following failure. 
In order to obtain a pool of potential subjects, a 
questionnaire item developed by Seligman (Note 3) was 
administered to 344 stUdents enrolled in introductory 
psychology. This item was embedded in a large questionnaire 
packet that all introductory psychology students were asked 
to complete at the beginning of the quarter. In this item, 
students were aske~ to "imagine that you give an impottant 
talk in front of a group and the audience reacts 
negatively~" This item was selected because it has been 
shown to reliably assess individual differences in 
attributions, and because failure in both this hypothetical 
situation and the subjects' task in the experiment could be 
caused by either specific communication strategies or 
general communication abilities. 
For this situation, students were asked to specify the 
major cause for their failure and to then rate whether this 
cause was external or internal, stable or unstable, and 
specific or global using three 7-point scales (anchored with 
+3 and -3). Seligm~n (Note 3) has shown that positive 
scores on these scales are associated with attributing 
failure to effort and persistance following failure, while 
negative scores are associated with attributing failure to 
abilities and giving up_ In this study, it was predicted 
that scores on these scales would also be related to whether 
or not subjects would attribute failure to ineffective 
strategies and vary their strategic approaches following 
failure. 
, 
; 
" J 
J 
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From the pool of students, two groups of 15 students 
were contacted and enlisted for thisstudy.- A HIGH-MASTERY 
group was selected that rated_ the cause of failure as 
controllable (internal and unstable) and specific to that 
situation. A LOW-MASTERY group was selected that rated the 
cause of failure as uncontrollable (internal and stable) and 
global, that is, affecting performance in a wide range of 
situations. Subjects' mean ratings on these dimensions for 
this situation are shown in Table 7. 
Dependent measures. 
The same dependent measures used in Study I were used 
in this study to assess subjects' use of strategies, 
expectations of success, persuasive effectiveness, and 
verbal reports of attributions. Also, the same judges used 
in Study I rated subjects' presentations in this study. 
Composite indices of dissimilarity were calculated for each 
judge by averaging his/her separate ratings of dissimilarity 
for a presentation. The interjudge reliabilities for these 
indices were ~ = .32 for the second presentation, and ~ = 
.47 for the third presentation. 
indices of effectiveness (or change in 
Similarly, composite 
effectiveness) were 
calculated .for each judge by averaging his/her separate 
ratings of effectiveness for a presentation. The interjudge 
reliabilities for these indices were ~ = .62 for the first 
presentation, ~ = .56 for the second presentation, and ~ = 
.44 for the third presentation. As in Study I, judges' 
Table 7 
Study II 
S~bjects' mean ratings for the situation, "Yo~ give an important talk 
in front of a group and the audience reacts negatively." 
DIMENSION HIGH-MASTERY LOW-MASTERY t 
Internal/External -2.13 -2.33 • .88 
Stable/Unstable +1.87 -2.00 13.35* 
Global/Specific +0.79 -1.80 5.81* 
* E. < .001 
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composite ratings for a 'presentation were averaged to form a 
single overall index for that presentation; this was done 
for both the dissimilarity and effectiveness ratings. 
Debriefing. 
A debriefing procedure similar to that used in Study I 
was used in this study. As in Study I, no subject detected 
that the failure feedback was prerecorded and heard by all 
subjects, or that the experimenter was studying the use of 
strategies following failure. In addition, no subject 
realized that he had been preselected for his responses to 
the preselection questionnaire. As in Study I, the 
experimenter then explained the true purpose and hypotheses 
of the study in a manner that would eliminate the persistent 
impact of the failure feedback and deceptions. 
I 
J 
Results. 
Subjects' performance ~ expectations prior 1Q failure. 
As in Study I, subjects prepared and delivered their 
first presentation over an intercom to a judge prior to 
receiving any failure feedback. There did not appear to be 
any differences in subjects' strategic approaches on this 
first persuasive attempt. On the average, each HIGH-MASTERY 
subject used 3.1 of the 14 specific strategies and each 
LOW-MASTERY subject used 2.9 strategies (~(28)= .19, n.s.) 
(Table 8) (footnote 3). In addition, for none of the 14 
strategies was there a significant difference in the number 
of HIGH-MASTERY and LOW-MASTERY subjects that used it (Table 
9) • 
Despite these similar approaches in the first 
presentation, there was a slight difference in subjects' 
predictions of how successful they would be in persuading 
their peers to donate blood. Subjects predicted their 
success prior to delivering this presentation by estimating 
the percentage of students they would be able to 
successfully persuade. HIGH-MASTERY subjects predicted 
higher success rates (immediate success predictions) than 
did LOW-MASTERY subjects (means were 27.3% and 22.8%, 
~(28)= 1.33, ~<.20) (Table 10). There was also a 
corresponding difference in subjects' actual effectiveness, 
Table 8 
Study II 
Subjects' mean number of strategies used and effectiveness ratings 
for the first presentation 
ITEM 
Number of strategies used 
Effectiveness 
HIGH-MASTERY 
3.1 
47.9 
LOW-MASTERY 
2.9 
41.9 
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Table 9 
Study II 
Number of subjects using each persuasive strategy 
on the first presentation 
ITEM HIGH-MASTERY LOW-MASTERY 
Direct command 3 1 
Expertise 1 1 
Repetition 1 0 
Bargaining 4 2 
Direct request 1 2 
Peer pressure 0 0 
Ease, convenience, & safety 12 13 
Fear 3 3 
Guilt & shame 0 1 
Duty & obligation 3 1 
Interesting & enjoyable 1 1 
Pride & satisfaction 4 2 
Compassion, charity, & sympathy 1 1 
Critical shortage of blood 12 15 
51. 
Table 10 
Study II 
Subjects' mean predicttons of success 
ITEM HIGH-MASTERY LOW-MASTERY 
Immediate success prediction 
First presentation 27.}% . 22;:1% 
Second presentation 29.3% 23.1% 
Third presentation 28.910 24.5% 
Long-term Success prediction 38.1% 33.1% 
52. 
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as measured by judges' ratings. The mean effectiveness of 
HIGH-MASTERY presentations was rated at 47.9, while the mean 
effectiv~ness of LOW-MASTERY presentations was rated at only 
41:9 Lt(28)= 2.35, Jl.< .03) (Table 9). 
Thus, on the first presentation, given prior to being 
told they had failed, there were difference~ between the two 
groups in actual performance and expectations but not in the 
choices of specific strategies. 
Sub jects' performance .ru:t1. expectations following failure. 
Afte·r each presentation, .all subjects heard a "judge" 
evaluate their presentations. Each judge (actually 
tape-recorded messages) stated that the mock radio 
presentation was not very effective and would have failed to 
persuade even an average number (301) of students to donate. 
What effect did this failure manipulation have on subjects' 
subsequent presentations and their expectations regarding 
future performance? HIGH-MASTERY subjects made more 
strategic changes in their presentations and expected higher 
levels of future success than did LOW-MASTERY subjects. 
As predicted, HIGH-MASTERY subjects were more likely to 
vary their strategic approach to the task over the three 
trials than were LOW-MASTERY subjects. Evidence for this 
appears in Table 11, which shows the mean number ~f times a 
subject either added a strategy that was not used or dropped 
a strategy that was used on the previous trial. 
Table 11 
Study II 
Subjects' mean dissimilarity ratings, number of strategy ~hifts, and 
effectiveness change ratings for the second and third presentations 
TI'EM 
Dissimilarity 
Second presentation 
Third presentation 
Number.of strategy shifts 
Second presentation 
Third presentation 
Effectivenss change 
Second presentation 
Third presentation 
HIGH-MASTERY 
19·5 
17.8 
1.8 
1.7 
1.7 
1.9 
LOW-MASTERY 
18.1 
15.8 
2.6 
0.1 
54. 
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HIGH-MASTERY subjects made an average of 1.8 strategy 
shifts, while LOW-MASTERY subjects made only .7 shifts on 
the second presentation (~(28)= 2.85, ~< .01). HIGH-MASTERY 
subjects then made an average 
LOW-MASTERY subjects made only .5 
presentation (~(28)= 2.21, ~< .05) 
of 1.7 shifts, while 
shifts on the third 
By adding the number of 
shifts a subject made on the second and third presentations, 
we find that HIGH-MASTERY subjects also made a larger total 
number of shifts than LOW-MASTERY subjects. On the average, 
HIGH-MASTERY subjects made a total of 3.5 shifts while 
LOW-MASTERY subjects made only 1.3 (~(28) = 3.18, ~< .005). 
However, these differences in number of strategy shifts were 
not detected by the more general and indirect measures 
assessing how dissimiliar the first and second presentations 
were (~(27)= 1.02, n.s.) or how dissimilar the second and 
third were (~(27)= .76, n.s.). 
HIGH-MASTERY subjects also predicted higher success 
rates for the second presentation (means were 29.3% and 
23.8%,. ~(28)= 1.75, ~< .10) and the third presentation 
(means were 28.9% and 24.5%, ~(28)= 1.56, ~< .20) (Table 
10). When they were asked to predict their long-term 
success in an upcoming blood drive, HIGH-MASTERY subjects 
predicted a success rate of 38.1% while LOW-MASTERY subjects 
predicted a success rate of only 33.1% (~(28) = 1.48, 
~< .16). 
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It is interesting that the magnitude of differences 
betweep HIGH-MASTERY and LOW-MASTERY subj~cts' predictions 
of success did not appear to change during the experiment. 
When the effect of subjects' ~nitial success predictions on 
Trial 1 is removed by analyses of covariance, there is no 
significant difference in HIGH-MASTERY and LOW-MASTERY 
subjects' predictions 
(.1(27)= 1.11, n.s.) 
(.1(27)= .94, n.s.), or 
for the sec ond 
or third 
even the upcoming blood 
on campus (.1(27)= .65, n.s,). 
presentation 
presentation 
donor drive 
Despite differences in the use of strategies following 
failure, HIGH-MASTERY subjects did not appear to improve 
their actual effectiveness more than did LOW-MASTERY 
subjects. There was no difference between judges' ratings 
of effectiveness change for either the second presentation 
(.1(27)= .36, n.s.) or third presentation (.1(27)= .65, n.s.) 
(footnote 4). 
Subjects' verbal reports of attributions for failure. 
Finally, subjects' verbalizations and questionnaire 
responses were examined to determine if HIGH-MASTERY and 
LOW~MASTERY subjects reported different attributions for 
failure. Recall that each time subjects "failed" in the 
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experiment, they were asked to state what they were thinking 
about. These verbal reports were recorded, transcribed, and 
categorized as in Study I. Table 12 shows the number of 
subjects in each condition who reported each type of 
attribution. These data indicate that there were no 
significant differences in the attributions subjects made. 
In fact all subjects in both conditions mentioned strategy, 
indicating , as in Study I, that for this task strategy was 
perceived to be a major determinant of task outcome. In 
contrast, only 4 subjects mentioned effort. 
However, subjects' questionnaire responses at the end 
of the experiment, but prior to debriefing, suggested a few 
differences in verbal reports. In a Seligman-type 
questionnaire, subjects were asked to specify the primary 
cause for their failures and to then decide whether this 
cause was external or internal, unstable or stable, and 
specific or global. Table 13 indicates that for this 
questionnaire, both groups on the average rated the causes 
as slightly internal, with no difference in these ratings 
between groups (means were -.1 and -.8, ~(28)= .93, n.s.). 
However, HIGH-MASTERY subjects on the average rated these 
causes as slightly unstable (.47) while LOW-MASTERY subjects 
rated them as slightly stable (-.47) (~(28)= 1.43, A< .2). 
HIGH-MASTERY subjects also rated these causes as specific 
(1.0) while LOW-MASTERY subjects rated them as global (-.9) 
(~(28)= 3.18, A< .01). Apparently, for failure at this 
task, subjects made ratings that on the average were similar 
Table 12 
Study II 
Number of subjects making verbalizations in each category 
CATEGORY HIGH-MASTERY LOW-MASTERY 
Strategy 15 15 
Ability 8 7 
Effort 2 2 
Trait 10 9 
Mood 11 13 
Circumstances 11. 9 
Repeat 8 10 
other 0 0 
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Table n 
Study II 
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Subjects' mean ratings of Seligman-type and Weiner-type questionnaires 
ITEM 
Seligman-type questionnaire 
Internal/External 
Stable/Unstable 
Global/SpecifiC 
Weiner-type questionnaire 
Strategy 
Ability 
Effort 
Characteristics 
Characteristics 
Luck 
* l!.<.10 
** l!. < .01 
of judges 
of task 
HIGH-MASTERY 
-0.13 
0.47 
:1..00 
4.53 
5.20 
4.80 
4.40 
4.60 
2.20 
LOW-MASTERY i 
-0.80 
.93 
-0.47 1.43 
-0.93 3.18** 
4.60 
.15 
5.47 
.57 
5.73 1.97* 
4.40 0.00 
5.47 1.58 
1.93 
.54 
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to those they had made for the hypothetical speaking 
situation used in the preselection questionnaire. 
Using a Weiner-type questionnaire, instead of asking 
subjects to specify a cause, subjects were asked to consider 
a number of possible causes provided by the experimenter and 
to rate how important each was in determining task outcome. 
For this questionnaire (Table 13), there were no differences 
in how important the HIGH-MASTERY and LOW-MASTERY subjects 
thought strategy, ability, luck, and characteristics of the 
judges or the task were in determining task outcome. 
Surprisingly, HIGH-MASTERY subjects did rate effort as being 
less important (means were 4.8 and 5.7, ~(28)= 1.97, 
~< .10), perhaps indicating that strategies, not effort, 
were considered to be important in this task. 
Thus, as in Study I, there were few differences in 
subjects' verbal reports of attributions, even though there 
were stong differences in subjects' expectations and 
performance supposedly mediated by their different 
attributions for failure. 
r 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We have seen, in both studies reported, that the 
attributions subjects made for failure influenced the 
degree to which they changed their strategies following 
failure, their expectations of subsequent success, and 
the degree to which they improved with practice. In 
Study I, subjects induced to attribute their failures to 
ineffective strategies made more strategic changes in 
their presentations, expected higher levels of future 
success, and improved more with practice than did 
subjects induced to attribute their failures to low 
abilities. In Study II, subjects predisposed to 
attribute failures to strategies, made more strategic 
changes following failure and consistently predicted 
higher levels of subsequent success than did subjects 
predisposed to attribute failures to abilities. 
These results suggest the role of attributional 
"set" in determining individuals' responses to failure. 
When individuals are set to attribute task outcomes to 
the relative effectiveness of their strategies, they will 
respond to difficulty or failure by modifying those 
strategies, and will remain ~ptimistic about their future 
prospects. For example; consider an individual who 
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emphasizes the need for blood but fails to emphasize the 
ease of making a donation and the benefits that accrue to 
the donor. Upon finding that his communication is 
ineffective, he resolves to reverse this emphasis, and he 
remains confident, indeed may even become more confident, 
that he will succeed. He now "knows" how to persuade his 
peers. In contrast, individuals set to attribute task 
outcome to their abilities rather than strategies are 
less likely to consider or change the particular emphasis 
of their strategies and will be less optimistic about 
future prospects. For example, consider a second 
individual who also emphasizes the need for blood in his 
initial persuasive attempt. Upon finding that his 
attempt is ineffective, he concludes that he lacks 
persuasive abilities and that he is unlikely to succeed. 
In explaining his failure, he may recall past instances 
when he failed, decide that he failed in those instances 
because of his low abilities, and become more convinced 
by this additional "evidence" that he will fail in the 
future (cf. Jennings, Lepper, & Ross, 1978), 
An implication of the approaches used in the present 
studies is that these attributional "sets" may be 
determined in part by cues in the situation as in Study 
I, and in part by individual differences and 
predispositions as in Study II. In 'study I, the 
experimenter manipulated subjects' attributions merely by 
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referring to one or the other of two supposed opinions of 
a Red Cross worker. Despite the seeming trivial nature 
of this manipulation, it had a major impact on subjects' 
expectations and performance. In Study II, attributions 
were not manipulated at all. Instead, the pre-selected 
subjects were predisposed to attribute failure to either 
strategies or abilities. This predisposition was 
associated with their subsequent expectations and 
performance at the persuasion task in the experiment . 
. Of special interest were differences in subjects' 
performance and expectations even before their apparent 
failure at the task. In both studies, subjects set to 
attribute task outcome to strategies made more effective 
presentations prior to the failure manipulation than did 
subjects set to attribute task outcome to abilities. In 
Study II, they also made more optimistic predictions of 
their likely success rate on this presentation. Although 
not predicted, it is not surprising that thinking about 
persuasive strategies, and perhaps trying to select the 
best one, would improve performance and raise 
expectations (cf. footnote 5). But the effects of 
thinking about strategies did not end with the first 
presentation. Already we have seen that strategy 
attributions either induced or were associated with more 
strategic changes and higher expectations on the 
64. 
presentations following initial failure. In Study I, 
strategy attributions' also 'caused more improvement or 
increased effectiveness on the second and third 
presentations than did ability attributions. This 
finding may indicate that subject~ set to attribute 
outcomes to strategies rather than abilities were able to 
think of strategies that were "even better" than the ones 
they had initially selected. 
Subjects' verbal report& about attributions. 
There was one hypothesis that did not receive 
support in either study. There were no differences in 
subjects' verbal reports in Study I and only slight 
differences in subjects' verbal reports in Study II. 
This is surprising, of course, in view of the clear 
performance and expectancy differences obtained in both 
studies, differences supposedly mediated by subjects' 
different attributions. It is also surprising in view of 
the fact that verbal reports are often used successfully 
and, in many attribution studies are the Qllly measures 
used! Although these results are perplexing, we should 
note that they are not unprecedented in the attribution 
literature. As Bem (1972) noted, one often finds that 
"behavioral changes occur more easily, more strongly, 
more reliably, and more persuasively than the attribution 
changes that are, theoretically, supposed to be mediating 
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them" (p. 50). For example, in the Davison and Valina 
(1969) 'study, experimental subjects were willing to take 
more shocks than controls, but they did not differ in 
their verbal reports about the causes of their shock 
tolerance. Recently, such evidence was summarized by 
Nisbett and Wilson (1977), who concluded that verbal 
reports generally fail to detect all mediating cognitive 
processes, including attributions. 
What then can be concluded from the present failure 
of verbal measures? It is possible, of course, that the 
measures themselves were inadequate to the task and were 
insensitive to attribution differences that actually did 
occur. But the absence of differences in the present 
studies seems to have been too consistent, and such 
failures are too widespread, for this explanation to be 
comforting. A controversial, but more comprehensive 
explanation may be that offered by Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977), i.e., that individuals do not have conscious 
access to the attribution process mediating their 
behavior. Verbal reports may merely reflect subjects' 
attempts to infer or guess what this process might have 
been, and in the present experiments they apparently 
guessed wrong. An alternative to Nisbett and Wilson's 
radical suggestion is one that speaks to the issue of 
"timing." Specifically, it is possible that subjects were 
aware of and could have accurately reported their 
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attributions at the precise time the attributions were 
made; but once the attributions were made, they were 
forgotten and were no longer cognitively available. 
Thus, subjects who were asked to report on attributions 
they had made in the past (before their subsequent 
attempts at persuasion and the completion of various 
measures) may have siillply been unable to recall or 
retrieve those cognitive responses. 
Eoth versions of this "awareness" argument assume 
that attributions did in fact occur and that they 
mediated behavior, but that subjects were unable to 
report accurately about their existence and role. But 
the failure of verbal measures may instead indicate that 
there attribution process preceding and 
determining behavior, and it was thus impossible for 
subjects to report "accurately" about such processes. 
When subjects were asked to explain their behavior in the 
experiment, they attempted to answer by inferring what 
could have been plausible causes of it. Thus, a subject 
why he had low who explained, after the fact, 
expectancies might have inferred that his "attributions" 
to low abilities could have been important. But there 
was no guarantee that the subject would draw this 
particular inference; the subject instead might have 
inferred (as all subjects in both experiments did) 
attributions to strategies could have been important. 
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Both this argument and the "awareness" argument 
assume that verbal reports ~epresented inferences 
subjects made in attempting to answer the experimenter's 
questions, and to explain the plausible causes of their 
behavior. The essential difference between these two 
arguments thus concerns whether or not there was an 
attribution process which mediated subjects' behavior. 
The Nisbett and Wilson position assumes that there was an 
attribution process and that this process produced the 
performance and expectancy differences in the present 
experiments. The alternative position assumes that there 
was no attribution process. However, this position does 
not attempt to "explain" the performance and expectancy 
differences in the present experiments; it only explains 
the absence of differences in verbal reports. Still, 
this position does challenge the attributional 
interpretation offered in this paper. 
In view of these agruments, it appears that we 
cannot assume, at least on the basis of verbal reports, 
that an attribution process mediated the present results. 
This suggests that the "attribution" manipulation in 
Study I did not affect subjects' behavior by altering 
their attributions for failure. But then how did it 
affect subjects' performance and expectancies? One 
answer to this question would have us recall that this 
manipulation was a communication that attempted to 
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persuade subjects that either strategies or abilities 
were important determinants of task . outcome. The 
"strategy" message, accordingly, merely might have 
persuaded subjects that task outcome was caused by 
strategies employed and not general ability levels. It 
then becomes necessary only to postulate that thinking 
about strategies would lead a subject to change his 
strategies following failure, while thinking about 
abilities would not lead to such change. 
Still another interpretation of the present results 
is that the "strategy" message directly persuaded 
subjects that if they failed, but then changed their 
strategy, they would eventually succeed. The "ability" 
message, by contrast, persuaded subjects that if they 
failed once they could not avoid subsequent failures even 
if they changed their strategy. According to ,this 
interpretation, neither message prompted any 
consideration of the possible causes of failure, and 
certainly no consideration of the relative influence of 
strategy and ability in determining task outcome. Again, 
the message affected performance without affecting 
attributions. This interpretation, which threatens to 
trivialize the present findings by concluding that 
subjects simply yielded to a persuasive message to 
"cbange your tactics if you fail," cannot be dismissed. 
But we should note that the attribution manipulation in 
69. 
this study was specifically designed to avoid this 
interpretation (which had been directed at Jennings and 
Anderson (Note 1» by avoiding a direct persuasive 
message. In Study I, the experimenter did not say that 
an individual should or should not change strategies or 
that an individual who changed strategies would or would 
not be more successful. He merely commented that 
strategies or abilities appeared to be an important 
factor. In short, the "persuasive message" 
interpreta'tion of the present results does n'ot really 
seem very persuasive. It is the attributional 
implications of the information the experimenter 
-conveyed, and not particular suggestions for action, that 
seem to have been most important. 
Possible individual differences related ~ attributions 
in Study l.L. 
As already noted, there were performance and 
expectancy differences in Study II before the failure 
manipulation that supposedly prompted subjects to make 
different attributions for failure. Since Study II 
pre-selected subjects for differences in attributional 
tendencies, rather than experimentally inducing these 
differences, it is possible that the pre-selected groups 
may also have differed in abilities or their performance 
anxiety. These differences then, may have produced, in 
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whole or in part, the performance and expectancy results 
prior to the failure manipulatbn. In fact, it is likely 
that differences in abilities and anxiety and differences 
in attributions are correlated. Consider, for exam pI e, 
subjects' abilities. On the one hand, individuals who 
chronically attribute failures at persuasion tasks to low 
abilities rather than ineffective strategies will often 
give up~ They lose the chance to practice, and perhaps 
to sharpen their persuasive skills. If they persist in 
dOing this, it is unlikely that their abilities will 
improve, and their abilities may in fact deteriorate 
through disuse. On the other hand, individuals with low 
abilities will often fail in persuading others. If they 
repeatedly fail, they may learn that they have low 
abilities and make the appropriate attribution. Thus, 
ability attributions and actual abilities should be 
correlated, and we really don't know which was originally 
the cause of the pre-selected groups' responses to 
failure. In a sense, ability is a variable confounding 
the present results. But actually, the origin of 
responses is less important than the result. The result 
is the same in either case: individuals end up with low 
abilities and a predisposition to make ability 
attributions. There may even be a vicious circle 
connecting the two. Ability attributions lead to lowered 
abilities, which lead to more ability attributions, which 
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lead to still lowered abilities, .and so forth. 
Similarly, ability attributions and performance 
anxiety may have been corr-elated in Study II. Ability· 
attributions may lead individuals to believe that they 
cannot succeed, and this belief could increase their 
anxiety if they attempt the sa~e or a similar task in the 
future (cf. Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1978). In turn, 
high anxiety could cause people to per form less 
effectively such that they might eventually decide that 
they are "unable" to succeed. Once again, this may 
become a vicious circle that produces individuals who are 
pessimistic about the future and who are likely to fail 
in the face of difficulty. 
Strategy attributions and strategy use may also have 
been confounded in Study II. Individuals predisposed to 
attribute their performance to the strategies they employ 
might search for other, more effective strategies 
following initial setbacks .. Similarly, individuals 
predisposed to search for other, more effective 
strategies following initial setbacks might attribute 
their ~erformance to the strategies they employ. This 
relationship may be a circular one as in the case of 
abilities. But this time it may be a "virtuous" circle 
that produces individuals who are optimistic about the 
future, who gain practice in solving problems, and who 
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may have at their disposal a repertoire of persuasive 
strategies they have practiced in past attempt;. These 
characteristics, whether they were initially produced by 
their strategy attributions or by their actual strategy 
use, should increase the likelihood that subjects will 
discover ways to reverse initial setbacks and eventually 
succeed. 
To summarize, attributions in Study II may have been 
correlated with other variables which could have helped 
produce the results of that study. It would be a 
mistake, however, to conclude from this that subjects' 
were unrelated to performance and attributions 
expectancies. Recall that two approaches were used in 
designing the present research. Study II was a 
correlational study in which subjects were pre-selected 
for individual differences in attribution (and perhaps 
other dimensions). But Study I was an experimental study 
in which subjects were randomly assigned to experimental 
treatments which induced them to attribute failure to 
either strategies or abilities. This random assignment 
controlled for the effects of confounding variables such 
as ability levels, and we can conclude that the 
performance and expectancy differences in that study were 
caused by the attribution manipulation. Thus, Study I 
demonstrltes that strategy vs. ability .attributions are 
at least one cause of individuals' responses to failure. 
73 . 
.I.h.§. roleQf attributions .in .t.llil. creation of depression. 
One implication of the present stUdies is that 
strategy _attributions may be determined in part by the 
characteristics of situation and in part by individual 
differences or predispositions. Viewing strategy 
attributions ·~s resulting from individual differerices may 
provide a clue to understanding why certain individuals 
chronically become depressed and helpless following 
failure (that is, perform less well and have lowered 
expectancies of future success). A current explanation 
of this reaction is that "helpless" individuals 
consistently attribute failure to factors they cannot 
easily control while non-helpless individuals attribute 
failure to factors they can control (cf. Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Strategy attributions, and 
the corresponding problem-solving approach to failure, 
may underlie in part these differences between helpless 
and non-helpless, and between other debilitated and 
non-debilitated groups. In Study II, subjects were 
pre-selected who attributed failure at a communication 
task to either uncontrollable or controllable factors--an 
individual difference thought to underlie helplessness 
and depression. These differences were associated with 
significant differences in strategy use following 
failure. Recent· correlational evidence (Anderson.& 
French, Note 2) further suggests that depressed people, 
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shy people, and lonely people are less likely to 
attribute failure to ineffective strategies than are 
non-depressed, non-shy, and non-lonely people. For 
example, a lonely person who feels unable to make friends 
does not attribute his interpersonal failures to the 
inappropriate and ineffective strategies which he 
persists in using; 
low abilities (cf. 
he instead attributes his failures to 
Zimbardo, 1978). 
Are strategy attributions the best response 1Q failure? 
To place these studies in proper perspective, it is 
important to emphasize 
attributions appeared to be 
that although strategy 
an effective response to 
failure in the present studies, they may not be the best 
response to failure at all tasks or for all people. 
Earlier, while talking about the virtuous circle relating 
strategy attributions and strategy use, we implied that 
strategy attributions would always lead to increased 
success. But this virtuous circle may become vicious if 
an individual presumes that only strategies are 
important, when other factors such as ability or effort 
may also influence task outcome. 
The potentially harmful impact of strategy 
attributions is best illustrated with the anecdote of 
Uncle Jake, a man who is always coming up with ideas on 
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how to be a successful businessman. One time he opened 
up a fast food restaurant, re'asoning that families have 
lots of disposable income and that they would patronize a 
restaurant where they could take the entire family 
without getting dressed up. But he opened the restaurant 
a month before a MacDonalds moved into the area. After 
closing his business, Uncle Jake decided that his idea 
was a good one, but that even a good idea can't succeed 
if there is too much competition. The next time, he 
opened a movie theate~ which specialized in movies for 
children. He thought he would capitalize on the post war 
baby boom and the fact that his would be the only theater 
in town aimed at children. But this time he didn't 
anticipate the surprising popularity of soccer and the 
outdoor emphasis that summer that drew away his potential 
customers. After closing this business, he decided that 
it was a good idea, but that the idea had been aimed at 
the wrong audience--he should have catered to adults. In 
his most recent attempt, Uncle Jake started a discount 
pet food store, reasoning that many people have pets and 
dislike paying the high retail pet food prices. It was a 
good idea, he outguessed the competition, and he aimed at 
the right audience; but after spending most of his 
capital on stock, he was unable to afford an extensive 
advertising campaign. As a result, few people ever heard 
about his pet food store. He decided that he would have 
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succeeded if only he had been better capitalized, and he 
vowed to never make that mistake again. 
In each of-these ventures, Uncle Jake had a -good 
idea that was not quite on target. What was needed in 
each case was a fine tuning of strategies in order for 
the business to get off the ground. If we consider each 
failure in isolaticn, we may agree with Jake that he 
failed because of a specific tactical error, and that he 
should try again usin,g an improved strategy. But if we 
consider his consistent record of costly mistakes, we may 
conclude that Uncle Jake simply lacks the necessary 
business acumen, and is apt to fail no matter what 
specific strategies he uses. Uncle Jake would be better 
off if he realized this and invested his time and money 
elsewhere. 
While this anecdote demonstrates that strategy 
attributions can be inappropriate for some people, it 
also demonstrates the more general point that any 
attribution, made by any person, can be inappropriate if 
it is made indiscriminately. One must realize that 
failure has many causes, and making the wrong attribution 
for a failure could be a costly mistake. The key is that 
one must not presume the cause of failure. As noted 
earlier, presuming low abilities to be the cause of 
failure may lead to depression and helplessness. But 
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presuming ineffective strategies to be the cause may lead 
to the "Uncle Jake syndrome." To avoid these costly and 
maladaptive responses, there must be a mesh between 
attributions and reality. Only then can a person respond 
wisely to failure. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) Those familiar with the attribution literature 
will realize that this discussion mentions only a few of the 
many factors that can determine success and failure. This 
paper discusses only effort, strategy, and ability in order 
to draw a simple and clear distinction between those factors 
that a person can control and those factors that a person 
cannot control. 
causal factors 
In terms of Weiner's two-factor typology of 
(Weiner et al., 1971), this paper 
distinguishes between factors that are internal and unstable 
(controllable) and those factors that are internal and 
stable (uncontrollable). There are, of course, other causes 
and attributions in 
individuals' responses 
this 
to 
typology that may affect 
failure. For example, 
attributions to the difficulty of the task, a factor which 
is external and stable, could lead to giving up following 
failure. Attributions to luck, a factor which is external 
and unstable, could lead to persistance following failure. 
Also, a number of other factors have been mentioned in 
recent reformulations which have added new dimensions to the 
basic two-factor typology (cf. Abramson, Seligman,. & 
Teasdale, 1978; Weiner, 1979). 
85. 
2) This paper contrasts effort and strategy in 
order to highlight the role that strategy may play in 
determining behavior, and to describe why strategy may have 
been largely ignored in the attribution literature. Since 
this discussion may imply that effort and strategy operate 
independently, it is important to note that both factors are 
necessary determinants of behavior. As Hull noted, in 
describing his theory of motivation, behavior is a product 
of an energizing component which can be labelled "effort," 
and a directing component which can be labelled "strategy" 
( cf'. Bolles, 1967). 
3) All tests reported in this paper are based on 
two-tailed tests of significance. 
4) Preliminary. analyses suggested that judges' 
ratings of dissimilarity and change in effectiveness for 
subjects' second and third presentations, were confounded by 
their ratings of effectiveness for subjects' first 
presentation. In both studies, judges' ratings of 
effectiveness for the first presentation were correlated 
(£'s > .30) with their later ratings of both dissimilarity 
and change in effectiveness. Moreover, in both studies 
there were differences in rated effectiveness for the first 
presentation. 
influence of 
To 
this 
remove 
initial 
the potentially 
rating, all 
confounding 
analyses of 
dissimilarity and change in effectiveness, in both studies, 
are based on analyses of covariance, in which initial rated 
86. 
effectiveness is the cpvariate. For these analyses, df = 
27. 
5) These findings are interesting in that ve-ry 
little is said in the attributon literature about the 
• possible affects attribubons might have prior to failure. 
This literature instead concentrates on only the 
post-failure effects of attributions. A question to be 
pursued in subsequent research is whether pre-failure 
effects of attributional "sets" are unique to strategy 
attributions or whether they may occur with other 
attributions such as effort. 
